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Abstract
Several cross-section empirical studies argue that a higher tax burden or diﬀerent indicators
of statutory tax rates are associated with a smaller informal economy. I show that the
turnover of governments provides the key to understanding this relation. To this end, I
present evidence that once political turnover is controlled for, the data shows no association
between the tax burden and the size of the informal economy. This result is empirically robust
in a panel data consisting of 80 countries and 5 years. To account for this observation, I
develop a dynamic political economy model with two political parties alternating in oﬃce.
In equilibrium, if the incumbent party faces a higher probability of staying in oﬃce, it sets
a higher tax rate to invest more in productive public capital, while spending less for current
oﬃce rent. I argue that public capital is mainly utilized by the formal sector and this implies
that countries in which incumbent parties are more likely to stay in power, have a higher
tax burden but a smaller informal sector. Finally, I compare the model against the data and
present evidence that my theory is consistent with empirical observations.
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Several cross-section and panel data empirical studies associate higher tax rates with
a smaller informal economy. Examples of such studies are Johnson et. al. (1997, 1998),
Friedman et. al. (2000), and more recently Torgler and Schneider (2007). More recently,
Aruoba (2010) also documents a negative correlation between taxes and the size of the
informal economy. Graphically, plotting informal sector size vs. tax burden, corporate tax
rate, average labor income tax rate, or top marginal income tax rate1 in a cross-section
clearly indicates a negative relationship between these variables.
In this paper, I ﬁrst employ cross-section, static and dynamic panel data techniques to
show that the negative relationship between various measures of tax rates and the size of the
informal sector is signiﬁcant and robust. Moreover, the econometric analysis also explores
what factors might have caused it. To this end, I present evidence that once political
turnover is controlled for, the data shows no signiﬁcant association between tax rates or tax
burden and the size of the informal economy. Next, building upon the empirical analysis, I
develop a dynamic political economy model to account for this observation. In the model, the
government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices uses taxes on capital and
labor income of the formal sector to ﬁnance the provision of a productive public capital and
some oﬃce rent. The government is not fully benevolent and also gets utility from some oﬃce
rent, the amount of which is chosen by the incumbent government. Then I introduce political
frictions to the model, speciﬁcally by allowing two political parties to alternate the oﬃce with
some exogenous probability (i.e. Incumbency follows a simple Markov chain.), and focus on
the symmetric diﬀerentiable (interior) Markov perfect equilibrium of this environment. In
1At this point it may be important to emphasize the distinction between the tax burden and various
statutory tax rates. Tax burden is deﬁned as the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP and one might suspect
that the negative relation between the tax burden and the informal sector may arise simply because a larger
informal economy implies a smaller tax base, thereof a lower level of tax revenue. However, considering that
only imperfect estimates of the informal economy are included in the national income calculations, a larger
informal economy also implies a lower level of oﬃcial GDP. Moreover, as the empirical analysis in the next
section clearly shows, the negative relation is also evident between various statutory tax rates and the size
of the informal sector.
2equilibrium, if the incumbent party faces a higher probability of keeping the oﬃce (i.e.
the lower the political turnover), it has higher stakes in the future (because probability of
enjoying future oﬃce rent is higher) and it values future output more. Therefore, it charges
a higher tax rate today on the formal sector to invest more on productive public capital,
while spending less for current oﬃce rent. This result is based on the fact that a higher
probability of keeping the oﬃce next period (i.e. the incumbent gets more certain of it’s
tenure) changes the marginal rate of substitution between future oﬃce rent and current
oﬃce rent and therefore the incumbent spends less for the oﬃce rent today (i.e. steals less
today) and invests more in the productive public capital of tomorrow. Even though the tax
burden is higher, the tax revenue is increasingly used for the productive public good in the
formal sector. This stimulates incentives for being formal and reduces the size of the informal
sector. This result captures the main empirical ﬁndings of the above mentioned papers and
my empirical analysis. As described above, the model suggests that political frictions, more
speciﬁcally political turnover aﬀecting corruption (oﬃce-rent in my model’s terms ) and the
provision of a productive public capital in the formal sector are among the underlying causes
of the negative relationship between taxes and size of the informal sector. In the last part
of the paper, I compare the implications of the model against the data. Speciﬁcally, I take
the exogenously given probability of reelection data from a recent paper by Brender and
Drazen (2008), feed them into the model, and then compare various variables of interest
generated by the model against their counterparts in the data. Once calibrated to match
certain speciﬁc moments, the model performs quite well to account for the cross-country
correlation between the tax burden and the size of the informal sector.
My paper is distinct in the growing literature on the informal sector. As opposed to the
above mentioned empirical analyses, a common result in models dealing with an informal
sector is a positive relationship between the level of tax rate and the size of the informal
sector. A non-exhaustive list of the papers in this literature include Rauch (1991), Loayza
(1996), Fortin et.al (1997), Ihrig and Moe (2004), Busato and Chiarini (2004) and Amaral
and Quintin (2006). This result seems to be intuitive because higher tax rates may create
3incentives for people to avoid them and one way of doing this is participating in the informal
sector. Keeping taxes exogenous and letting the informal sector not paying any taxes (or
letting it pay a smaller fraction than the formal sector), this result is also immediate in a
two-sector neoclassical growth model with formal and informal sectors, where the variation
in taxes in exogenous. An alternative theoretical possibility might be that a higher tax rate
results from some institutional frictions (such as a low degree of tax enforcement) which may
create a larger informal sector and therefore, a smaller formal sector tax base. Following this
reasoning, in a two-sector environment with a benevolent government which taxes the formal
sector to ﬁnance some exogenous stream of government expenditures, a Ramsey equilibrium
features a positive relationship between tax rates and the size of the informal sector, i.e. a
larger informal sector resulting due to some friction (i.e. lower tax enforcement, or lower
productivity gap between the formal and the informal sectors) leads to a higher tax rate in the
formal sector. So existing theoretical frameworks cannot account the somewhat surprising
negative relationship between tax rates and the size of the informal sector.
Some of the above mentioned empirical papers indicating a negative relationship between
tax rates and the informal sector deserve more discussion as they are more closely related to
my paper.
Both Johnson et. al (1997) and Johnson et. al (1998) use diﬀerent sets of countries
in their empirical analyses; however, both end up with the conclusion that tax rates are
negatively correlated with the size of the informal sector. Johnson et. al (1997) also provide
a very simple model in which the only two stable equilibria of the model feature totally
formal and totally informal economy. However, their model, contrary to their empirical
ﬁndings, implies a positive relationship between the tax rates and the size of the informal
sector. On the other hand, Johnson et. al (1998) claim that both administration of taxes
and regulatory discretion are playing key roles in this result and once they take composite
indices of both tax rates and quality of tax administrations into account, they ﬁnd that
these indices are positively correlated with the size of the informal sector. However, the
quality indices they use are largely based on subjective evaluations of certain experts and
4institutions and therefore prone to measurement errors and endogeneity issues.
Friedman et. al (2000) suggest that the positive correlation might have been caused by
several institutional factors such as corruption and bureaucratic quality. Similarly, much
more recently Aruoba (2010) develops a general equilibrium model where the key factor cre-
ating the variation in taxes and the size of the shadow economy is the quality of institutions,
more speciﬁcally the degree of tax auditing by the government. Accordingly, changes in
these factors could let the businesses hide their activities from the government, which by
reducing the tax revenues and harming the quality of public administration further reduces
a ﬁrms incentives to remain formal. In their empirical study, Friedman et. al (2000) also
ﬁnd that increasing tax rates by one point implies that the share of the unoﬃcial economy
falls by 9.1%. Controlling for several variables and instrumenting on others reduces this
number by half, but the negative tax coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant. The conclusion of their
empirical study is that this is probably because higher tax rates generate revenue that pro-
vides productivity enhancing public goods, a strong legal environment and low corruption.
However, they only consider the production side of the economy and their highly stylized
partial equilibrium model only focuses on the corruption part of the story.2
Finally, the modeling of public ﬁnance in my paper is related to the growing literature of
Markov-perfect taxation models. Earlier work in this literature includes Cohen and Michel
(1988) and Currie and Levine (1993). Later, Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) analyzed Markov-
perfect labor and capital taxes in a model where the government can only commit to the
following period’s capital tax. More recently, Klein et al. (2008) and Martin (2009) study a
model of public expenditure and characterize and solve for the equilibrium of the dynamic
game between successive governments. As opposed to my work, none of the above mentioned
papers have a political economy dimension or an informal sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Empirical evidence indicating a robust
negative relationship between taxes and the informal sector is provided in the next section.
2In the next section of my paper I show that the negative correlation between taxes and informal sector
remains signiﬁcant, even after controlling for corruption, bureaucratic quality or tax enforcement. This
suggests that these factors do not explain the whole story.
5In this section, I empirically investigate what causes the negative relationship between taxes
and the size of the informal sector. In section 3 the benchmark model is presented. Here, I
ﬁrst describe the environment and then deﬁne and characterize the competitive equilibrium.
Next, given the competitive equilibrium, the symmetric diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect equi-
librium is deﬁned and characterized. Section 4 describes empirical implications of the model
and then compare model simulations against the data. Lastly, section 5 concludes.
2 What Do Data Tell?
2.1 Taxes and the Informal Sector
This subsection investigates the relationship between diﬀerent measures of taxes and the
size of the informal sector. First, I describe the data and then present results of several
econometric estimations.
2.1.1 Data
Informal Sector Size: The informal sector consists of economic activities that are not
reported to the government statistical oﬃces. Statistical oﬃces usually try to estimate these
activities in the unoﬃcial economy; however, these estimations are imperfect by their nature.
In the literature people used various methods to estimate the size of the informal sector in a
given economy. One method is exploiting the fact that the short-run electricity-to-GDP elas-
ticity is usually close to one and uses electricity consumption to estimate the informal sector
size.3 An alternative method is the MIMIC (multiple-indicator multiple-cause) approach4 in
which the size of the informal economy is estimated from observations of the likely causes
and eﬀects of the underground economy. Lastly, there is also the currency demand approach
which is based on demand for cash-to-GDP elasticity, similar to the electricity consumption.
Obviously, each method has it’s own advantages and disadvantages5 the discussion of which
3See Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) for details of this method.
4MIMIC method is ﬁrst suggested by Loayza (1996).
5See Tanzi (1999) and Schneider (2007) for a discussion.
6is out of the scope of this paper. In this paper, I use panel estimates of Schneider (2007)
running from 1999 to 2005 6 which combines a dynamic version of MIMIC with the currency
demand approach.7
Taxes:
In the econometric estimations I use various measures of taxes to check the robustness
of the analysis. One such measure is the tax burden data from the Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) data of IMF.8 I also use taxes on income, proﬁts and capital gains (as
percentage of GDP) from the World Development Indicators. Moreover, I also used the
ﬁscal freedom indicator of the Heritage Foundation which is a composite index stemming
from the top tax rate on individual income, the top tax rate on corporate income, and
total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Yet another alternative source is the data on top
marginal income tax rate from the Fraser Institute. The reported regression results mainly
use the tax burden data from the GFS; however, the results do not change if one uses other
types of taxation data from the above mentioned sources.9 Notice that results also do not
depend on whether one uses data on statutory taxes (main part of the Heritage Foundation’s
ﬁscal freedom index) or actual taxes, such as the tax burden data from GFS.10
To illustrate the negative correlation, ﬁgure 1 depicts the relationship between the infor-
mal sector size and tax burden in a cross-section. Figure 2 uses the ratio of revenue from taxes
on income, capital gains and proﬁts to the GDP on the x-axis. Moreover, ﬁgure 3 draws11
informal sector size vs. the ﬁscal freedom index provided by the Heritage Foundation.12
One can also argue that a large (small) informal sector resulting in a small (large) formal
sector; therefore, a small (large) tax base could lead to a low (high) level of tax revenue and
6Schneider (2007) reports one estimate for two consecutive years, so the span of the time series is 5.
7See Schneider (2007) for details and superiority of this methodology to others and comparisons of various
methods previously used to estimate the size of the informal sector.
8Throughout this paper tax burden is deﬁned as the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP.
9Estimation results using the various diﬀerent tax data are available upon request.
10Also see Aruoba (2010) for a discussion.
11All ﬁgures use cross-section averages for 80 countries between the years 1999 and 2005. The list of these
80 countries is provided in appendix D.
12Notice that the freedom index becomes larger when tax rates get smaller, therefore a positive correlation
between the index and informal sector size is qualitatively equivalent to a negative correlation between taxes
and the size of the informal sector.
7therefore reduce (increase) the tax burden which makes the informal sector size and the tax
burden to be negatively correlated. However, since the oﬃcial GDP statistics include only
imperfect estimates of the informal sector, a large informal sector also reduces the oﬃcial
GDP which is the denominator in the tax burden formula. Moreover, in case oﬃcial GDP
statistics include perfect estimates of the informal sector size I also check the correlation
between the informal sector size and a diﬀerent measure of the tax burden, by dividing the
total tax revenue not by GDP but instead to GDP subtracted by the total informal sector
size. The correlation between this measure of the tax burden and the size of the informal
sector is −0.46. This indicates that the negative correlation between the tax burden and the
size of the informal sector does not arise from a variable tax base depending on the size of
the formal sector.
Other variables:
In the regression analysis I also use several control variables, such as GDP per-capita,
corruption and bureaucratic quality. I got the data for GDP per-capita from the Groningen
Economic Growth and Development Center. For corruption, I use corruption index data
both from Transparency International and Political Risk Services (ICRG).13 Similarly, the
measure of bureaucratic quality is obtained from ICRG, too. These three variables are the
ones extensively used in the empirical literature on the causes of the informal sector.
2.1.2 Estimation and Results
There are a number of studies analyzing the empirical relationship between taxes and
the size of the informal sector. In certain studies, especially those who do not control for
variables measuring institutional quality, found some empirical support suggesting a positive
relationship between taxes and the shadow economy. Schneider and Enste (2000) provide
an excellent review of this empirical literature.
However, other empirical studies such as Johnson et.al. (1998), Friedman et.al (2000),
Kucera and Xenogiani (2009) revealed that, once institutional quality is taken into account,
13Reported results use data from ICRG, however using Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency
International do not change the results of the estimations.
8the size of the informal sector and various measures of tax rates are negatively correlated.
To check the robustness of the negative relationship evident in ﬁgures 1, 2 and 3, I run
a number of regressions using diﬀerent explanatory variables.
In the static panel data analysis14, the estimated equations are of the following form:
ISi,t = β0 + β1taxi,t +
n X
k=2
βkXki,t + θi + γt + i,t
where Xki,t are the other explanatory variables in addition to taxes and θi, γt are the
country and period ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. Moreover ISi,t is the size of the informal sector
relative to GDP and taxi,t is the tax rate. Notice that, when I include institutional variables
such as corruption, and bureaucratic quality in Xki,t (and to some extent even the GDP
per-capita) the estimation may become prone to endogeneity issues. Therefore, I also redo
the estimation using instrumental variables, namely latitude (Hall and Jones (1999)), an
indicator variable for presidential vs. parliamentary regimes (Lederman et. al. (2005)), an
indicator variable for transition countries, and indicator variables for the legal system (La
Porta et al. (1999)).
One should also notice that, in addition to the cross-country pooled regression and the
static panel data analysis, I also perform a dynamic panel data analysis in which I use
one-period lagged value of the informal sector size as an additional independent variable.
Speciﬁcally, I estimate the following equation:
ISi,t = β0 + β1taxi,t + β2ISi,t−1 +
n X
k=3
βkXki,t + θi + γt + i,t
Static panel data models and their estimators do not take the serial correlation, het-
eroscedasticity and endogeneity problems that may occur in such dynamic models into ac-
count. To overcome these kind of problems, dynamic panel data model estimation techniques
a la Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) can be used since they were
ﬁrst to develop an instrumental variables technique to estimate dynamic models. Then, as
14I also report results of a cross-section estimation using the 5-year averages of the panel data.
9well known, Griliches and Hausman (1986), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) also developed similar
estimators. These estimators use lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments in
the diﬀerenced equations. They are consistent but generally not eﬃcient since they do not
take all restrictions on the covariances between regressors and the error term into account.
To overcome this issue, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a dynamic version of the gen-
eralized method of moments estimator. They argued that the estimators obtained through
this method are also eﬃcient since this method is based on using additional instruments
(lagged values of the dependent variables and other explanatory variables) which satisfy the
orthogonality conditions.
All the results of the above described estimations are presented in table 1. First columns
presents the cross-section regression results whereas second, third and the fourth columns
show the ﬁxed eﬀect panel data regression outputs. In column 5 I report the results of the
IV estimation and lastly in the sixth column I present the results of the dynamic panel data
analysis using the above discussed Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. The results indicate
that that negative relationship between the tax burden and the size of the informal sector
is quite robust. Moreover, in table 2, analogous to table 1, I report the results when I use
the ﬁscal freedom index, instead of the tax burden. Notice that the ﬁscal freedom index is
an index which gets smaller as statutory taxes increase. So positive sign of its coeﬃcient is
expected. In addition to these estimations, I replicate the same analysis using a measure of
tax burden which I obtain by dividing total tax revenue by GDP subtracted by the total
informal sector size. Signs of the coeﬃcients do not change and t-statistics become even
larger. Moreover, suspecting that the tax burden might be endogenous with respect to the
size of the informal sector, I also run a system estimation using 3SLS which doesn’t show
any evidence against the negative correlation.15
15Results of further econometric analysis are available upon request.
102.2 Do the Data Tell More?
The previous subsection presented results indicating a negative relationship between tax
rates and the size of the informal sector. The model I present in the next section to account
for this phenomenon relates this ﬁnding to political frictions, speciﬁcally to the varying
degree of political turnover in diﬀerent countries. As brieﬂy discussed in introduction, the
model implies that countries in which the political turnover is high, the level of tax burden
is low. However, tax revenues are mainly wasted due to corruption which makes the level of
productive public investment also low. This leads to a larger informal sector. This subsection
provides empirical evidence to support this argument, i.e. investigates political turnover’s
role in results of the previous subsection.
2.2.1 Data
Political Turnover:
In addition to the control variables used in the previous subsection, here I include a mea-
sure of political turnover among the independent variables. Speciﬁcally, I use two measures
of political turnover. One is the probability of reelection index developed by a recent paper
by Brender and Drazen (2008) using election data from a large number of countries. Another
measure is obtained from ICRG’s political stability index16 which is a composite measure
for government unity, legislative strength and popular support.17
2.2.2 Estimation and Results
The estimations here aim to test the following hypothesis: Political frictions play an
important role in the composition and the level of public ﬁnance. The estimations investigate
the role of political stability as the key frictions The idea is that, if the political stability is
higher, in other words the incumbent is more certain that it will stay in the oﬃce, it will direct
16When using the political stability index I also use the level of democracy index from Polity IV database
among the control variables.
17Probability of reelection database is available for 58 countries of 80 countries in my informal sector
dataset. Also, it is only a cross-section data whereas the political stability index of ICRG is a yearly panel
and available for all the 80 countries from 1999 to 2005.
11more of the tax revenues for productive public investment and less for wasteful government
spending, speciﬁcally oﬃce rent and corruptive activities. Even though, the overall tax rate
increases due to to increasing political stability, the change in the composition of public
spending makes the formal sector more attractive for households.
The hypothesis above predicts that a higher political stability (or probability of reelec-
tion) is associated with lower level of corruption, higher level of productive government
spending, higher tax burden and also a smaller shadow economy. In this section, I provide
some empirical evidence for these predictions.
The results of this section’s analysis are presented in diﬀerent panels of the tables 3 and
4. The ﬁrst column, Pooled 1, reports the cross-section regression results with probability
of reelection as a measure of political stability. Other columns use ICRG’s political stability
index instead. First, in table 3, I use tax burden as the dependent variable and estimate
several equations with it. The estimations support the hypothesis, namely the positive re-
lationship between the tax burden and political stability. Next, I estimate the relationship
between corruption and political stability. Results support the hypothesized negative re-
lationship. Moreover, political stability also seems to be positively correlated with GDP
per-capita. Lastly and most importantly, in table 4 I investigate the relationship between
the informal sector size and political stability using diﬀerent equations and estimation tech-
niques. According to the empirical analysis, informal sector size and political stability seem
to be negatively correlated. Moreover, once political stability or probability of reelection
are controlled for, the correlation between the tax burden and the informal sector size, even
though negative, deceases to be signiﬁcant. To close the order of the logic it would be nice
to get some results on the relationship between productive public spending and political
stability. Unfortunately, since there isn’t any widely accepted way of distinguishing between
productive and wasteful public spending in the data, I cannot report any results about this.
However, there are some empirical studies supporting the logic of my paper. 18,
18Kneller et.al. (1999) distinguish between productive and unproductive expenditures in a government
spending database of a subset of OECD countries and conclude that productive government spending is
positively associated with income and growth. Fiva and Natvik (2009) come to a similar conclusion using
local data from Norway. Also, Mauro (1998) ﬁnds evidence that corruption is negatively associated with
123 Model
In this section I present the model of the paper. First, I describe the general environ-
ment and deﬁne the competitive equilibrium. Then, I describe the Markovian environment,
deﬁne a politico-economic (symmetric, diﬀerentiable, interior Markov-perfect) equilibrium
and characterize it. Next, I provide and discuss the analytical solution in a simpliﬁed envi-
ronment. Lastly, I brieﬂy discuss an extension of the benchmark model.
To study the relationship between taxes and the size of the informal sector, I use a two-
sector growth model with public investment. In this economy, there is a unit measure of
households and a government.
3.1 Households
Households can divide their labor endowment between two sectors: formal and informal.
These two sectors produce a single non-storable consumption good. Speciﬁcally, a stand-in





subject to the following budget constraint
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δk)kt = rtkt(1 − τkt) + wftnft(1 − τnt) + yit(nit)
and the time constraint
nft + nit = 1
where nft is the amount of time the household spends in the formal labor market, and
nit in the informal labor market. Labor and capital income in the formal sector are taxed at
productive government spending.
19In the benchmark model, I assume that leisure is not valued. Since adding leisure involve no signiﬁcant
changes in the main results at the expense of much more notation, I decided not to include the extension in
this version of the paper. However, I shortly discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption at the very
end of this section.
13rates τkt and τnt respectively. Moreover rt and wft stand for the rental rate of capital and
formal wage rate respectively. yit(nit) represent the informal sector income. Lastly, δk is the
depreciation rate for private capital. The budget constraint suggests that a household has 3
sources of income: Labor and capital income in the formal sector net of taxes (the ﬁrst two
terms on the right hand side of the budget constraint) and income from the informal sector.
Hence, given k1, {rt, wt, τkt, τnt}∞







subject to the following budget constraint
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δk)kt = rtkt(1 − τkt) + wtnft(1 − τnt) + yit(nit)
and the non-negativity and time constraints
ct,kt+1,nit,nft ≥ 0
nit + nft = 1
Simplifying the notation to save some space, one can obtain the following ﬁrst-order
conditions at an interior solution of the consumer’s problem:
−Uct + βUct+1(1 − τkt+1)rt+1 = 0
Uct(1 − τnt)wft − Uctwit = 0
where wit stands for the wage rate in the informal sector.20
20Moreover, Uct and Uct+1 represent the derivatives of the utility function with respect to ct and ct+1,
respectively.
143.2 Technology
Technology for each ﬁrm in the formal sector is given by
yft = f1(kt,nft,Gt)
Gt stands for the productive public capital.
On the other hand, I assume that each ﬁrm in informal sector produces according to the
following decreasing returns to scale technology21:
yit = f2(nit)
Notice that the informal sector uses only labor as an input.22
3.3 Government
The source of uncertainty in the economy arises due to the following political structure:
There are two political parties, party 1 and party 2, which can be in power at any t ≥ 0.
Technically, let the state of incumbency be deﬁned at any period t, as zt ∈ Zt = {1,2}. I
further assume that the uncertainty follows a Markov process, i.e. at the end of each period,
the incumbent political party stays in the oﬃce with an exogenous probability of ρ or loses
the oﬃce to the other party with probability 1 − ρ, i.e. Pr(zt+1 = i|zt = j) = Πij = 1 − ρ
and Pr(zt+1 = i|zt = i) = Πii = ρ, for i,j ∈ {1,2}






ρ 1 − ρ




21Technically, I assume that
∂f2






22None of the results of the paper would change if I had allowed the informal sector use a lower share of
public and private capital than the formal sector. The current setup however simpliﬁes the environment a lot
without aﬀecting the basic results. Notice that, this simplifying assumption is also used in Loayza (1996).
15One can interpret 1 − ρ as the measure of the degree of political turnover.23
I also assume that the incumbent balances the government budget each period. In the
budget there are two potential sources of revenue: Labor and capital income taxes from
the formal economy. The incumbent party also chooses how much of this revenue to spend
for productive public investment Gt+1 and for the oﬃce rent St.24 Hence, the government
budget is given by:
rtKtτkt + wftNftτnt = St + Gt+1 − (1 − δg)Gt
where δg is the depreciation rate of public capital, Kt and Nft are the aggregate private
capital and formal labor, respectively.
I further assume that the objective functions of the two political parties are symmetric,
i.e. the period utility of the incumbent party i ∈ {1,2} is given by
U(Ct) + U
g(St)
whereas the period utility of the opposition party is simply U(Ct). Notice that, under
this assumption, it doesn’t matter for households whether party 1 or party 2 is in power
at any period t, because the policy choice of each incumbent is symmetric, i.e. the same.
Therefore, households’ decision is independent of the party in power. This makes the decision
of households and the competitive equilibrium environment deterministic.25
This form of the government utility generated a non-benevolent government which gets
utility from the oﬃce rent it acquires from the tax revenue, in addition to private consump-
tion. Lastly, I deﬁne the aggregate resource constraint of this economy as:
Ct + Kt+1 + St + Gt+1 = Yft + Yit + (1 − δk)Kt + (1 − δg)Gt
23Alternatively ρ can be interpreted as the degree of political stability or probability of reelection. I use
all these three terms interchangeably throughout the paper.
24St can be interpreted as nonproductive public spending, oﬃce rent or embezzlement. This is why this
is party speciﬁc and can only be beneﬁted from when in oﬃce.
25To be precise I could have deﬁned the households’ problem and the technologies as functions of the
history of the realization of the uncertainty. However, this would only create an excess of notation, without
any need for it.
16Here, Yft and Yit stand for aggregate formal and informal output, respectively.
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Now, having described the general environment, I can deﬁne the competitive equilibrium
of this economy for a given policy.
Deﬁnition 3.1 For a given government policy
Q
= {τkt,τnt,St,Gt+1}∞
t=1 and k1, G1, a com-
petitive equilibrium for this economy is an allocation vector for households {ct,kt+1,nft,nit}∞
t=1
and a price vector {rt,wft,wit}∞
t=1 such that
1. Given prices and government policy, the allocation vector of households solves the
households’ problem.
2. Prices satisfy rt =
∂Yft
∂Kt , wft =
∂Yft
∂Nft, and wit =
∂Yit
∂Nit
3. Government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
4. Aggregate resource constraint holds.
3.4.1 Characterizing Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions which hold for
all t ≥ 1
1. Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt = rtKt(1 − τkt) + wtNft(1 − τnt) + Yit(Nit)
2. −Uct + βUct+1(1 − τkt+1)rt+1 = 0
3. Uct(1 − τnt)wt − Uctwit = 0
4. rtKtτkt + wtNftτnt = St + Gt+1 − (1 − δg)Gt
5. Ct + Kt+1 + St + Gt+1 = Yft + Yit + (1 − δk)Kt + (1 − δg)Gt
6. limt→∞ βtλtKt+1 = 0
17where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the household budget constraint at
time t. The ﬁrst equation is simply the aggregate household budget constraint, the second
equation is the Euler equation from the households’ ﬁrst-order condition. Similarly, the third
equation comes from the households’ ﬁrst-order conditions equating the marginal products
net of taxes in the formal and informal sectors. The fourth equation is the aggregate resource
constraint and lastly, the last constraint is the transversality condition.
3.5 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
3.5.1 Environment
The equilibrium concept employed here is the same as that in Krusell, Quadrini, and
Rios-Rull (1996), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) and more recently Martin (2009). The key
assumption is that the government does not commit to any of it’s future policy choices. In
each period, the government acts ﬁrst, choosing current period policies. The equilibrium
is called to be Markov-perfect since the government’s choices depend only on the value of
the current periods state, in this case just the aggregate private and public capital stocks.
Additionally, I only consider equilibria where policy depends diﬀerentiably26 on the private
and public capital stock. (i.e. I assume that the policy functions are diﬀerentiable with
respect to the state variables.) Lastly, after the government has moved, the private sector
chooses its current period action.
3.5.2 Deﬁnition
Consider the two ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem of the household and notice that
in a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the government follows a set of policy functions that are
only functions of public and private capital today. After setting ς = (K,G) to be the vector
of state variables27, let me deﬁne G0 = Γ(ς), τk = Θk(ς) and τn = Θn(ς) to be these objects.
Households will understand that in equilibrium government follows policy functions Γ, Θk,
26For details of an environment with non-diﬀerentiable ﬁnite-horizon equilibria, see Krusell, Martin and
Rios-Rull (2006)
27Also to save some space I deﬁne ς0 = (K0,G0).
18and Θn; thus, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the private sector yield stationary decision rules
for private capital tomorrow and labor in the formal sector today28 that only depend on the
private and public capital stock today. Calling them K(ς), and Nf(ς) respectively, I can







0)) = 0 (1)
ϕ(ς,ς
0,Nf,τn,τk) = 0 (2)
The two equations above characterize household behavior for the current period for any
arbitrary policy of the current government given that the government follows ΘK, Θn and Γ
and thus implement K, and Nf.
Moreover, I can deﬁne the following aggregate functions for the oﬃce rent and private
consumption.
S(ς) = rKτk + wNfτn − G
0 + (1 − δg)G (3)
C(ς) = rK(1 − τk) + wNf(1 − τn) + Yi − K
0 + (1 − δk)K (4)
Now, given the perception that governments follows some policy Γ, ΘK, and Θn which
in turn induces household and government behavior given by , K(ς), and Nf(ς), I can write
the problem of the current incumbent party as follows:
V (ς) = max{K0,G0,Nf,τk,τn} U(C(ς)) + U
g(S(ς)) + β{ρV (ς
0) + (1 − ρ)W(ς
0)} (5)




0∗) + (1 − ρ)V (ς
0∗)} (6)
28Notice that informal sector labor is known once the formal sector labor is calculated.




consumption, tomorrow’s private and public capital, respectively, chosen by the incumbent.
I restrict my focus on (diﬀerentiable) symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria (SMPE) of
the above described game. This leads to the following deﬁnition of equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3.2 An interior SMPE is deﬁned by two value functions W(ς) and V (ς) and
policy functions, K, Γ Θk Θn, Nf such that for all K ∈ (0, ¯ K] and for all G ∈ (0, ¯ G], where
K∗ = K(K∗,G∗) < ¯ K and G∗ = Γ(K∗,G∗) < ¯ G and given the Markov chain regulating the
probability of reelection ρ the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Given the value functions W(ς) and V (ς), policy functions K, Γ Θk Θn, Nf solve the
government maximization problem for the variables K0, G0, τk, τn, and Nf, respectively.
2. Given the policy functions K, Γ Θk Θn, Nf value functions W(ς) and V (ς) satisfy the
functional equations in (5) and (6).
3. Policy functions are diﬀerentiable in both of their arguments.
3.5.3 Characterizing Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
In this subsection, I characterize the interior symmetric diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect
equilibrium in the general environment deﬁned above. To this end, I state the following
characterization theorem:
Proposition 3.3 The interior symmetric diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium (inte-
rior) is a set of smooth functions {Θn,Θk,K,Γ,Nf}, that for all K ∈ (0, ¯ K] and G ∈ (0, ¯ G]
satisfy the equations (1) and (2), together with the following equations:
Θn = 0
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Proof. See Appendix A
The ﬁrst equation above simply states that all the burden of taxation in this environment
falls on capital. The other two equations are the generalized euler equations characterizing
the Markov-perfect equilibrium. Even though they seem somewhat complicated and the
derivation of them are quite diﬃcult, they show two simple things and are very intuitive:
For example, the second one shows the trade-oﬀ that the incumbent faces by investing one
more unit of public capital today. Investing one more unit of public capital Gt+1 today
directly reduces St by one unit. That is why the the second equation starts with the term
−Us. It also distorts the euler equation of the households which is represented by the term
λz2. However, depending on the value of ρ it brings beneﬁts tomorrow and thereafter.
These beneﬁts are represented by the terms after β. With probability ρ, the incumbent
of today stays as the incumbent tomorrow and continues to enjoy the oﬃce rent, which is
represented by the term β[ρUs0[Y
f0
G0 + 1 − δg]]. On the other hand, the incumbent loses the
power with probability 1 − ρ. However, even if it loses the power, it can still aﬀect the
decisions of the next period’s government. This is because the current incumbent plays as a
Stackelberg leader against the next period’s incumbent. This incumbency advantage of the
current incumbent is represented by the last three terms in the curly bracket.
In a similar fashion, the ﬁrst equation illustrates the trade-oﬀ the incumbent faces by
investing one more unit of private capital today. All the discussion for the second equation
above also applies to the ﬁrst one.
213.5.4 A Simple Finite Period Analysis
Before conducting numerical experiments with the general environment of the inﬁnite
horizon economy which is characterized above, here I ﬁrst discuss the Markov-perfect equi-
librium in a much simpler ﬁnite-period economy. The ﬁnite horizon allows me to get certain
crucial analytical results under some speciﬁc simplifying assumptions. On the other hand, in
the next section I present numerical solutions of the inﬁnite horizon economy without using
some of the speciﬁc assumptions below.
Now, for this subsection I make the following assumptions on the form of the utility and
production functions and the depreciation rates of private and public capital:
Assumption 1 U(Ct) = αclog(Ct) and Ug(St) = αslog(St), where αc + αs = 1
Assumption 2 Yft = F1(Kt,Nft,Gt) = KγN
1−γ
ft (Gt
Kt)γ and Yit = F2(Nit) = N
1−γ
it
Assumption 3 δk = δg = 1
Notice that in this setup the formal sector production function exhibits constant returns to
scale both at individual and aggregate levels. Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992) argue that
the way that G enters the formal sector production function with congestion reﬂects public
goods which are rival but not excludable. However, since the informal sector cannot utilize
these public goods in this setting, makes them excludable for the informal sector.29
Assume for now that the economy only lasts for T periods and T = 2. Below I consider
the symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in this environment. By deﬁnition, in a Markov-
perfect equilibrium, households and the government base their decisions only on the current
state variables; in this case, the aggregate private and public capital stock at the beginning
of each period.
The timing of choices in this setup is as follows: In the ﬁrst period, the incumbent, after
observing G1 and K1 (which are initially given), chooses S1, G2, τn1, and τk1 subject to the
government budget constraint, taking the following as given:







wouldn’t change the results. However, it would make the household’s problem more complicated due to the
fact that the production function would be of decreasing returns to scale in individual ﬁrm level.
221. Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraints and markets are com-
petitive.
2. The policy implemented by the government in period 2, which is a function of K2 and
G2.
3. The exogenous probability ρ of keeping the oﬃce in period 2.
In the second period the government in oﬃce observes K2 and G2 and chooses τn2, τk2, and
S2, taking as given that households maximize utility. I further assume that the incumbent
lacks commitment, even if it had been in power in the previous period which implies that
the government in period 2 will not internalize how it’s actions aﬀected the decisions made
in period 1.
Lastly, using the timing described above, I solve the model by backward induction. The
results can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4 Under assumptions 1-3 and for αs small enough30 symmetric Markov-
perfect equilibrium allocations of the ﬁrst period feature 31
1. Tax rate on formal labor income is zero in both periods.
2. Tax burden falls on capital in both periods.
3. As probability of reelection (ρ) increases, the ﬁrst-period incumbent invests more in the
productive public good and spends less in the oﬃce rent.
4. As probability of reelection increases, the increase in the productive public investment
is more than decrease for the ﬁrst-period oﬃce rent, i.e. the tax burden in the ﬁrst
period also increases.
30This assumption is needed for an interior solution. Otherwise, if αs is above some threshold value, then
the incumbent conﬁscates the entire private capital stock and this shuts down the economy.
31Technically, the proposition can be summarized by τn1 = τn2 = 0, τk1 > 0, τk2 > 0
∂τk1







∂ρ > 0, ∂Ni2
∂ρ < 0,
∂Yf2
∂ρ > 0, ∂Yi2
∂ρ < 0
235. An increase in the probability of reelection reduces the amount of labor spent in the
informal sector for the second period.
6. An increase in the probability of reelection reduces the size of the informal sector in the
second period.
Proof. See Appendix B
Notice that, the results of the two-period model can be somewhat misguiding for the
desired results of the paper. This arises due to the fact that the ﬁnite period model implicitly
assumes that T = 2 is the end period, where no private and public investment is made
anymore. Obviously, such a period does not exist for the inﬁnite horizon economy. Also, for
a two-period economy, some of the ﬁrst-period allocations generally depend on the initially
given state variables, namely K1 and G1. However, the two-period model still provides
helpful insights for the understanding of the main mechanism of the model which will still
be valid for the results of the inﬁnite horizon economy.
The formal proof of the proposition is provided in the appendix, however below I brieﬂy
discuss the intuition of the above stated results.
First result in the above proposition states that the tax rate on formal labor in both
periods is equal to zero and the burden of taxation falls on capital. The labor tax in the
second period is equal to zero, because the incumbent of the second period is facing a static
problem and due to the existence of an informal sector, the tax on formal labor income is
distortionary, whereas since the capital of the second period is already invested, the capital
income tax is not distortive. Hence, all the burden of taxation falls on capital. However,
the tax rate on capital in the second period depends on the value of αs, and τk2 < 1 if
only if αs is suﬃciently low. Otherwise, K2 = 0 and the economy shuts down in the second
period. That is why an interior solution requires αs to be small enough. Now, under this
assumption, the economy is at the ﬁrst-best (Uc2 = Us2) in the second period because the
only used tax instrument, the capital tax, is non-distortionary. Therefore, both S2 and C2
are constant fractions of the second period total output. Next, using this result, assumption
2 and equation 2, I can express S2, C2, Nf2 and Ni2 as functions of G2 only. More speciﬁcally,
24one can also obtain Nf2 as an increasing function of G2.
Having all the second period allocations derived as a function G2 only, one can write
the problem of the incumbent in the ﬁrst period. Now of course, ρ plays an important role
here, because from the ﬁrst period’s perspective, whether the ﬁrst-period incumbent will
enjoy oﬃce rent in the second period or not, depends on the value of ρ. In this sense, ρ
increases the weight of the oﬃce rent of the second period in the ﬁrst period incumbent’s
utility function. Therefore, as the probability of reelection, i.e. ρ, increases, the marginal
rate of substitution between current oﬃce rent and future oﬃce rent and the marginal rate
of substitution between current private consumption and future oﬃce rent changes in favor
of the future oﬃce rent. This lets the current incumbent decrease the current oﬃce rent
and increase the tax rate on current capital to reduce current private consumption. With
more tax revenue at hand, the incumbent invests more on the productive public investment.
Notice that, the labor tax in the ﬁrst period is also equal to zero and the burden of taxation
fall on capital again. However, the government in the ﬁrst period additionally faces an inter-
temporal distortion created by the capital tax in the second period. This distorts the margin
between private consumption and oﬃce rent in the ﬁrst period.32
For the last two statements, one might be curious to ask what happens to the formal
and informal sector labor in the ﬁrst period. Formal and informal sector labor in the ﬁrst
period depend on ﬁrst period’s stock of private and public capital, K1 and G1, and the labor
tax rate. Since K1 and G1 are exogenously given and τn1 = 0, formal and informal labor in
the ﬁrst period together with formal and informal output are ﬁxed. However, formal and
informal labor of the second period are functions of the public capital of the second period
which is an increasing function of ρ. So, as the probability of reelection increases, so do the
formal sector labor and the formal sector output in the second period; which in turn reduce
the relative size of the informal sector in the second period.
The two-period economy with the simplifying assumptions can be generalized to a an
arbitrary T period economy. Moreover, letting T → ∞, I can state the following result for
32Technically Uc1 < Us1.
25the equilibrium of the inﬁnite horizon economy as the limit of the above described ﬁnite
horizon economy:
Proposition 3.5 For αs small enough and assuming that the assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold,
there exists an interior Markov-perfect equilibrium of the inﬁnite horizon economy in the
above described environment in which the steady state statistics feature:











where Y = Yi + Yf. This proposition is actually an extension of proposition 3.4. The proof
is discussed in appendix B. I should also note that proposition 3.5 does not actually give
much information in addition to proposition 3.4. It simply states the key results of the
two-period environment extend to an inﬁnite horizon environment.33 Notice that with both
propositions at hand, I have an environment in which both the relative size of the informal
sector and the tax burden depend on the exogenous probability of reelection. An increase
in this probability also increases the tax burden but reduces the size of the informal sector,
exactly as we observe in the data.
3.5.5 Adding Leisure-Labor Choice
Even though the model above assumes that households do not value leisure, it can easily
be extended to include leisure in the utility function without changing main results, most
importantly the one concerning the relationship between the tax burden and the size of the
informal sector. Since it only brings more notation and longer derivations, I decided not to
include this extension in this version of the paper. However, I still can state the main results
of the model extended with leisure. However, ﬁrst the assumptions have to be adjusted to
the environment with leisure:
33Notice that the steady state features a labor tax rate which is equal to zero. However, the tax rate on
formal labor can be easily be made positive by making the current capital tax also distortionary. One way
of doing this is extending the model with endogenous capital utilization by allowing households to choose
the amount of private capital to be utilized in the formal sector production function. This way, without
changing the desired result of the negative correlation between the tax burden and the informal sector size
one can have both positive capital and labor taxes in the steady state. Since such an extension does not
change any of this paper’s results, I refer to Martin (2009) for such an extension.
26Assumption 4 U(Ct,`t) = αclog(Ct)+α`log(Lt) and Ug(St) = αslog(St), where αc +α` +
αs = 1
Notice that Lt stands for aggregate leisure. In this environment, I can state the following
theorem:
Proposition 3.6 For αs small enough and under assumptions 2, 3, and 4 there exists an
interior Markov-perfect equilibrium of the inﬁnite horizon economy in the above described










The proof is simply an extension of proposition 3.5 and is brieﬂy discussed in the ap-
pendix.34
4 Numerical Analysis
This section conducts a quantitative analysis of the model’s results without the assump-
tion 3, i.e. in this section I relax this assumption to the following:
Assumption 5 δk ∈ [0,1] and δg ∈ [0,1],
Moreover, I keep the assumption 1; however, I also relax the assumption 2 to the following:
Assumption 6 Yft = KγN
1−γ
ft (Gt
Kt)µ and Yit = F(Nit) = N
φ
it
Krusell and Smith (2003) show that this class of dynamic policy games may feature
both diﬀerentiable and non-diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect equilibria. However, I restrict my
attention only on diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium and numerically calculate the
steady state statistics of this economy. I describe the relevant computational algorithm in
appendix C.
34One setback of the environment with leisure is that the tax on formal labor which was zero in the
previous environment becomes negative now. So in equilibrium there is a labor subsidy which turns out to
be a decreasing function of ρ. The idea here is that the incumbent uses labor subsidy to correct part of the
distortion created by the capital tax. One way of having a positive labor tax is to introduce endogenous
capital utilization a la Martin (2009). However, all these complications do not involve any signiﬁcant changes
in the main results, therefore are not included in this text.
274.1 Parametrization and Calibration
The parameterization of the baseline economy is standard. The capital share, as standard
in the RBC literature is assumed to be equal to γ = 0.36. Moreover, I assume that β = 0.96,
δk = 0.08, δg = 0.1. Lastly, I take µ = 0.15 from Eicher and Turnovsky (2000).
Now, the only remained parameters are αs in the utility function and φ in the informal
sector production function. These, I calibrate. What I do in the next subsection is that, once
I calibrate these two parameters, I take the probability of reelection data given by Brender
and Drazen (2008), feed their series into the model as ρ and then obtain generated series of
relevant endogenous variables in the steady state, i.e. tax burden,
rtKtτkt
Yt , the relative size of
the informal sector,
Yi
Yf, public capital-output ratio G/Y , and lastly oﬃce rent-output ratio
S/Y .
4.2 Quantitative Results and Experiments
I calibrate αs and φ to match the average size of the tax burden and the informal sector
size in my dataset.35 Speciﬁcally, I calculate the average probability of reelection in the
data, feed this average value into the model as the ρ and then back out the values of the
two parameters mentioned above required to match the average size of the tax burden and
the informal sector size. In ﬁgures 4 to 7, using the calibrated values for αs and φ, I plot
certain endogenous variables of interest against various values of ρ to see the mechanism
behind the model’s crucial result. As ﬁgure 4 shows, increasing ρ reduces the size of the
informal sector, and as the next ﬁgure, ﬁgure 5 shows, it increases the tax burden. However,
the two components of government spending go into diﬀerent directions. As probability of
reelection increases, public capital-output ratio goes up and oﬃce rent to output ratio goes
down. These two are illustrated in ﬁgure 6 and 7. Next, ﬁgure 8 compares the model’s
performance against the data. The model performs remarkably well in accounting for the
observed negative relationship between the tax burden and the size of the informal sector.
Moreover, in ﬁgure 9, I compare the linear regression lines drawn for the actual data and for
35The calibrated values are αs = 0.11 and φ = 0.45
28the model generated data. The slopes are almost the same and the two lines almost overlap.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a model to account for the surprising negative relationship
between the tax burden and the size of the informal sector. First, I established this relation-
ship in a panel data analysis and showed that the empirical result is robust. Moreover, the
empirical analysis hints that the key to understanding this phenomenon might be a a speciﬁc
political friction, namely political turnover. However, existing models of the informal sector
are not capable of accounting for this relationship. Towards this purpose I developed model
of ﬁscal policy with two sectors where the government lacks commitment and incumbency
follows a Markov chain with two political parties which can be in power at any time. Political
turnover, with the way I introduce it, crucially aﬀects both the level and the composition of
government revenue and spending. The lower the turnover, the lower the unproductive oﬃce
rent and the higher the productive public spending. Moreover the tax burden increases with
political stability. Even though the tax burden is higher, the tax revenue is increasingly used
for the productive public good in the formal sector which creates incentives for being formal
and thereby reduces the relative size of the informal sector.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, it mainly contributes to the literature
on informal economy and taxes, informal economy and corruption, and informal economy
and productive public goods. Noticing that most work done in these areas are empirical
and lack a strong theoretical basis, this paper provides a general equilibrium model and ﬁlls
in the theoretical gap in the literature with a novel mechanism. Second, to the best of my
knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to utilize empirical results of a panel data set
among the other empirical papers on the informal sector. Lastly, this paper also contributes
to the literature on optimal Markov-perfect ﬁscal policy by adding an informal sector and a
political economy dimension to standard models of this literature.
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34Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3.3
First-order conditions of the maximization problem (speciﬁed by the functional equation
5 subject to the constraints 1, 2, 3, and 4 with respect to K0,G0,Nf,τk,τn are as follows,
respectively:
UcCK0 + β(ρVK0 + (1 − ρ)WK0) + λz1 + µϕK0 = 0 (A.1)
UcCG0 + β(ρVG0 + (1 − ρ)WG0) + λz2 + µϕG0 = 0 (A.2)
UcCNf + UsSNf + ληNf + µϕNf = 0 (A.3)
UcCτk + UsSτk + λητk + µϕτk = 0 (A.4)
UcCτn + UsSτn + λητn + µϕτn = 0 (A.5)
Notice that λ and µ are the Lagrangian multipliers on the constraints η and ϕ, and z1
and z2 are deﬁned as follows:






































Since Cτk = −Sτk, Cτn = −Sτn, ητk = −λUccCτk and ητn = −λUccCτn, ﬁrst-order condi-
tions with respect to τn and τk can be rewritten as:
−UcSτk + UsSτk + λUccSτk + µϕτk = 0 (A.6)
−UcSτn + UsSτn + λUccSτn + µϕτn = 0 (A.7)
Notice that ϕτk = 0, whereas ϕτn = −Ucwf. This implies that µ = 0 as long as Nf > 0.
35Exploiting this result, λ can be obtained from the ﬁrst-order condition τn or τk as λ = −Us−Uc
Ucc .
Wit this result, and using SNf = τnwf, CNf = (wf(1−τn)−wi) the ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to Nf becomes now:
Uc(wf(1 − τn) − wi) + Usτnwf + λUcc(wf(1 − τn) − wi) = 0
Since wf(1−τn) = wi this implies that τn = 0, as long as Nf > 0, so all the tax burden falls
on capital every period.
Now, I turn my attention to the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to K0 and G0. It can




G + 1 − δg]
VK = Uc[Y
f
K + 1 − δk]




K0. Since I cannot




G0 by the following operations: First,
to get W
0
K0, I derive W with respect to K.
WK = UC{[1 − γτk]Y
f
K − KK + 1 − δk} + βKK{ρW
0





G0 + (1 − ρ)V
0
G0} + λz3
where z3 the derivative of η with respect to K, i.e. z3 = −UccCK + KKz1 + ΓKz2




























Plugging these back into the expression for WK:
WK = UC{[1 − γτk]Y
f
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Plugging everything back into the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to K0 and simplifying
yields:
−Uc + λz1 + β[ρUs0[Y
f0



















+ (1 − 2ρ)Uc00[Y
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One can get the equation with G0 exactly in the same way
−Us + λz2 + β[ρUs0[Y
f0



















+ (1 − 2ρ)Uc00[Y
f00











+ (1 − 2ρ)Us00[Y
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4 is deﬁned analogous to z
0
3.
B Proofs of Propositions 3.4 and 3.5
Consider the two-period version of the model. I will solve the model by backward induc-
tion starting from the second period:
Since the second period is the ﬁnal period, households do not invest in private capital
and consume all of their income. Similarly, the government does not invest in the public
capital either. Therefore, from the budget constraint we can write C2 = Yf2 + Yi2 − S2.
Moreover, the labor and capital taxes can be obtained as functions of Nf2 and S2 only using
(1 − τn2)wf2 = wi2 and τk2 =
S2
γYf2 − τn2wf2. Now, for any given G2 and K2, the problem of
the incumbent in period 2 can be written as, choosing S2 and Nf2 to maximize
U(Yf2 + Yi2 − S2) + U
g(S2)
Under assumption 1, ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to S2 and Nf2 respectively are:
Uc2 = Us2
Uc2(wf2 − wi2) = 0
Comparing the second equation with equation 2 in the paper, I obtain τn2 = 0, i.e. all
the tax burden falls on K2. Now, the ﬁrst equation, together with assumption 1 implies
that consumption and oﬃce rent in the second period are constant fractions of total output,
i.e. C2 = αcY2 and S2 = αsY2. Moreover, from the second ﬁrst-order condition above and




2 . Hence all the second period allocations can be deﬁned
as a function of G2 only.37
Next, using the Euler equation I obtain K2 = m1(Y1−G2−S1), where m1 is an increasing
37Notice that simplifying assumption 2 allows to deﬁne all the variables with respect to G2 only. In a
more general environment, everything should be a function K2 and G2.
38function of G2.38. By the resource constraint of period 1, it follows that C1 = (1−m1)(Y1 −
G2 − S1). Next, I consider the maximization problem of the ﬁrst period incumbent: Given
some initial K1, G1, and the probability of reelection ρ, the ﬁrst period incumbent chooses









g(S1) + βU(C2) + βρU
g(S2)
subject to the following constraints:
C1 = (1 − m1)(Y1 − G2 − S1)
K2 = m1(Y1 − G2 − S1)
C2 = αcY2
S2 = αsY2
So this objective function clearly shows the eﬀect of the ρ. Increasing ρ aﬀects the
marginal rate of substitution between tomorrow’s oﬃce rent and current oﬃce rent, cur-
rent private consumption and tomorrow’s private consumption. Notice that C2 and S2 are




S1(wf1 − wi1) = 0
This implies that τn1 = 0. Hence, all the burden of taxation falls again on capital.
However, the incumbent of the ﬁrst-period cannot avoid the distortion created by the second







39period capital tax. This distorts the margin between the private consumption and oﬃce rent
in the ﬁrst period. (i.e. UC1 6= U
g




S1 = (1 − m1)UC1
This shows that a higher G2 makes S1 more expensive.
With assumption 1, on the form of the utility functions one can also obtain
S1 = αs(Y1 − G2)
This equation shows that, given K1, G1 which since τn1 = 0 directly determine Nf1 and
Ni1, an increase in G2 implies a reduction in S1. Moreover, the reduction S1 is less than the
increase in G2, because αs < 1.
Lastly, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to G2 allows us express G2 as a function of
initially given K1, G1, and all the parameters, including ρ. Speciﬁcally,
(αc + ραs)γ = [G2(γ − αs) − αs]f(G2)
where f(G2) is an increasing function39 of G2, provided that αs < γ. So as one can see from
the above equation, increasing ρ increases G2 and hence by the equation deﬁning S1 reduces
S1. Moreover, since αs < 1, the increase in G2 if more then the reduction in S1 causing the
tax burden of the ﬁrst period to increase. Since the capital tax is the only tax instrument
used by the government, this means that τk1 increases due to an increase in ρ.
Now, having proved the proposition 3.4, one can easily generalize the results of the above
described ﬁnite period economy, ﬁrst to an arbitrary T period economy and then letting
T → ∞ to an inﬁnite horizon economy. To this end I brieﬂy discuss the proof proposition 3.5









40as results valid for periods T and T − 1. By continuing to iterate backwards I can write for
any j ∈ {0,1,2,....T − 1}
CT−j = (1 − mT−j)(YT−j − GT−j+1 − ST−j)
KT−j+1 = mT−j(YT−j − GT−j+1 − ST−j)
where mT−j is an increasing function of GT−j+1. Having deﬁned CT−j and KT−j+1, given
K1 > 0 and G1 > 0, I can deﬁne the problem of the incumbent in period T − j as the
following40:
V
T−j(GT−j) = max{ST−jGT−j+1,Nf,T−j,} U(CT−j) + U
g(ST−j) +
β{ρV
T−j+1(GT−j+1) + (1 − ρ)W
T−j+1(GT−j+1)}
subject to the expressions for CT−j and KT−j+1 deﬁned above. Now taking the ﬁrst order
conditions of the above deﬁned maximization problem and as analogous to the case in the
two-period world the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ST−j and Nf,T−j imply τn,T−j = 0.
Moreover, from the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ST−j implies
U
g
ST−j = (1 − mT−j)UCT−j
Furthermore, using the form of the utility functions one ends up with ST−j = αs(YT−j −
GT−j+1). As it can be seen from the repetitive pattern of the equations all the results of ﬁrst
period allocations in the two-period model generalize to any period T −j. The same is also
true for GT−j+1 which can be expressed as an increasing function of ρ from the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to GT−j+1. Once GT−j+1 is obtained as an increasing function of ρ,
the rest follows from the above for period 1 in the two-period economy which happens to be
the period T − 1 in a T-period economy. Now, using the expressions coming from the ﬁrst-
order conditions and exploiting the fact that all the parameters entering into the formulae
40Again I exploit the very special form of the production function of the formal sector here were compared
to the general case µ = γ. This allows me to write the value functions in terms of the public capital only.
41for the relevant variables are between 0 and 1, T → ∞, the ﬁrst period T −j = 1 allocations
converge to a limit, in which their behaviors with respect to ρ become unchanged.
Proposition 3.6 is an extension of the proposition 3.5 with leisure in the utility function.
The only diﬀerence between this case and the previous environment is that, even though all
the burden of taxation falls on capital again, formal labor is now subsidized. Moreover, as ρ
increases, the level of tax subsidy also increases. However, the increase in public investment
is still more then the reduction in the oﬃce rent, which increases the capital tax rate more
than the previous case. See Martin (2009) for more details in an environment with leisure
in the utility function.
C Computational Algorithm
To compute the interior diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium, I use41 the global
method described in Martin (2009). Given any ρ, the basic algorithm is as follows:
1. Deﬁne a pair of grids over K and G.








f followed from tomorrow on, using the equations characterizing Markov-perfect
equilibrium. Call the solution K1, Γ1, Θ1
k, Θ1
n ,and N 1
f .
4. Check the convergence of all decision rules. If the convergence error is not small






f = N 1
f .
Notice that, since I assume diﬀerentiability of the policy functions, I interpolate the
points between the grid points to evaluate the policy functions and calculate the derivatives
of them. To be able to do so, I use cubic splines.
41I thank Fernando Martin for sharing his codes with me.
42D Country List
List of Countries Included in the Panel and 80-Country Cross-Section Re-
gressions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ja-
maica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tai-
wan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, USA,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
List of Countries Included in the 58-Country Cross-Section Regressions: Ar-
gentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Ro-
mania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela.
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Source: Scatter plot of informal sector size (as a ratio to GDP) against the tax burden (tax revenue to GDP ratio) I plotted averages 
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Source: Scatter plot of informal sector size (as a ratio to GDP) against the taxes on income profits and capital gains (Revenue to 
GDP ratio). I plotted averages from 1999 to 2005. Tax burden is calculated from the World Development Indicators Database  and 

















































Source: Scatter plot of informal sector size (as a ratio to GDP) against the fiscal freedom index. I plotted averages from 1999 to 
2005.Fiscal freedom index is obtained from the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Database  and informal sector size data is 






















































































































































0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
























































































































































48 Table 1: Informal Sector and Tax Burden
Dependent variable: IS
Pooled Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS-IV GMM
Tax Burden -0.45 -0.52 -0.51 -0.48 -0.49 -0.55
(0.169) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
GDP per-capita -0.08 -0.075 -0.07 -0.072 -0.069 -0.072
(0.01) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024)
Bureaucratic Quality -1.95 -1.92 -1.79 -1.8 -1.78
0.85 (0.76) (0.73) (0.79) (0.74)
Corruption -1.7 -1.4 -1.42 -1.41
(0.67) (0.65) (0.69) (0.63)
IS(-1) 0.39
(0.12)
R-squared 0.57 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.45
Observations 80 400 400 400 400 240
F-Test 29.18 78.71 49.52 63.38
Hansen J-Test 0.11
AR(2) Test 0.28
All panel regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported coeﬃcient in
parentheses. Corruption (which gets a larger value as the countries get less corrupt) and bureaucratic
quality indices are from ICRG, GDP per-capita from Groningen Economic Growth and Development
Center. Tax Burden Data is from GFS and informal sector data is from Schneider (2007).
Table 2: Informal Sector and Fiscal Freedom
Dependent var: IS
Pooled Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS-IV GMM
Fiscal Freedom Index 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.18
(0.059) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
GDP per-capita -0.093 -0.075 -0.077 -0.079 -0.081 -0.082
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034)
Bureaucratic Quality -1.84 -1.74 -1.76 -1.74 -1.68
0.75 (0.78) (0.91) (0.89) (0.92)
Corruption -1.76 -1.44 -1.41 -1.42
(0.67) (0.62) (0.69) (0.65)
IS(-1) 0.40
(0.13)
R-squared 0.52 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.46
Observations 80 400 400 400 400 240
F-Test 21.45 71.84 44.18 58.67
Hansen J-Test 0.09
AR(2) Test 0.23
All panel regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported coeﬃcient in
parentheses.Corruption (which gets a larger value as the countries get less corrupt) and bureaucratic
quality indices are from ICRG, GDP per-capita from Groningen Economic Growth and Development
Center. Informal sector data is from Schneider (2007) and the ﬁscal freedom index is from the Heritage
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index Database.
1Table 3: Regressions with Political Turnover
Dep. Var: Tax Burden
Pooled 1 Pooled 2 Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS-IV GMM
Political Stability 4.58 4.32 4.01 4.22 4.41
(2.3) (1.01) (1.15) (1.14) (1.11)
Probability of Reelection 17.23
(5.4)
Tax Burden(-1) 0.92 0.85 0.88
(0.39) (0.29) (0.31)
R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.29 0.44 0.49




Pooled 1 Pooled 2 Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS-IV GMM
Political Stability 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.41
(0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
Probability of Reelection 3.7
(1.01)
Corruption(-1) 0.89 0.73 0.74
(0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
R-squared 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.32
Observations 58 80 400 320 400 240
Hansen J-Test 0.11
AR(2) Test 0.13
Dep. Var: GDP per-capita
Pooled 1 Pooled 2 Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS-IV GMM
Political Stability 21.19 21.26 21.44 20.65 20.99
(4.12) (3.12) (4.52) (2.99) (3.43)
Probability of Reelection 11.99
(3.4)
GDP(-1) 0.29 0.31 0.32
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
R-squared 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.39
Observations 58 80 400 320 400 240
Hansen J-Test 0.19
AR(2) Test 0.21
All panel regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported coeﬃcient in
parentheses. Political stability and corruption indices (which gets a larger value as the countries get less
corrupt) are from ICRG and probability of reelection data is from Brender and Drazen (2008). Informal
sector data is from Schneider (2007) and the data for tax burden is obtained from GFS. Lastly, GDP
per-capita is from the Groningen Growth and Development Center.
2Table 4: Regressions with Political Turnover
Dep. Variable: IS
Pooled 1 Pooled 2 Panel-OLS Panel-OLS Panel-OLS-IV GMM
Political Stability -2.91 -2.96 -2.87 -2.84 -2.99
(0.71) (0.72) (0.82) (0.89) (0.93)
Probability of Reelection -0.12
(0.04)
IS(-1) 0.34 0.34 0.36
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
Tax Burden -0.26 -0.05
(1.4) (0.12)
R-squared 0.22 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.29
Observations 58 80 400 320 400 240
Hansen J-Test 0.14
AR(2) Test 0.18
All panel regressions include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported coeﬃcient in
parentheses. Political stability index is from ICRG and probability of reelection data is from Brender and
Drazen (2008). Informal sector data is from Schneider (2007) and the data for tax burden is obtained from
GFS.
Table 5: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Tax Burden (in %) 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.47
Informal Sector Size (in %) 29 14 8.0 67
Political Stability Index 9.15 0.98 6.99 11.17
GDP per-capita(in thousand GK$) 13.65 9.52 1.23 34.76
Fiscal Freedom Index 70.71 15.27 32.3 99.9
Corruption Index 3.09 1.18 0.6 6
Bureaucratic Quality Index 2.17 1.15 1 4
Probability of Reelection 0.37 0.33 0 1
These are cross-section summary statistics of the panel averages. All the variables except the probability of
reelection consist of 80 countries. For probability of reelection I have data for only 58 countries.
3